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Sarah Horton 
Boston College 
Kamel Daoud’s recent novel Meursault, contre-enquête demands 
philosophical attention for its revisiting of the themes of solidarity and the 
absurd, both of which are central to Albert Camus’s works.1 The premise is 
that Haroun, the brother of the Arab Meursault killed, who was named 
Moussa, tells his story to an unnamed person (identified only as “un jeune 
universitaire”2) in a bar. In the world of this novel, Meursault wrote and 
published L’Étranger (entitled L’Autre),3 as well as other works.4 From the 
first sentence of Daoud’s novel, “Aujourd’hui, M’ma est encore vivante”5—a 
clear contrast to the first sentence of L’Étranger, “Aujourd’hui, maman est 
morte”6—it is evident that Haroun’s narrative replies to Meursault’s. In this 
paper, I argue that although the word “solidarity” does not appear in the 
novel, Daoud compels us to ask what it means to respond to the absurd by 
solidarity with others when most are fleeing from the absurd and few care 
about solidarity. I analyze the way in which Haroun is forced to confront the 
reality of the absurd and to discover his own resemblance to Meursault: 
both, it turns out, are murderers, and both are strangers to a society that 
refuses to acknowledge the absurd and that disregards solidarity. Although 
Haroun is replying to Meursault, the force of his reply will not lie in a 
greater correspondence with the facts. Rather, as I will show, the importance 
of his narrative lies in what he reveals about solidarity and the absurd. 
Daoud’s novel brilliantly reminds us that we must live in solidarity with 
others even if they hate us for acknowledging the absurd, even though no 
one—not Meursault, not Camus, and not Haroun—can offer a final, certain 
account of how to do so. 
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Murder and the Rejection of Solidarity 
It is necessary to briefly consider Camus’s understanding of the absurd and 
of solidarity before analyzing Daoud’s treatment of these themes in 
Meursault, contre-enquête. Camus explains that “[l]’homme se trouve devant 
l’irrationnel. Il sent en lui son désir de bonheur et de raison. L’absurde naît 
de cette confrontation entre l’appel humain et le silence déraisonnable du 
monde.”7 Neither human desires nor the world are the absurd; the absurd is 
the conflict between the human desire for happiness and for meaning and 
the world that is devoid of meaning and in which we must someday die. 
Camus calls for us to rebel against the absurd even though such revolt can 
have no objective meaning, and he maintains that a life of revolt is enough to 
satisfy: “Cette révolte donne son prix à la vie. Étendue sur toute la longueur 
d’une existence, elle lui restitue sa grandeur.”8 Happiness can be found 
through embracing life in defiance of the universe. In his later book 
L’Homme révolté, Camus calls us to respond to the absurd with a revolt that 
is solidarity, siding with our fellow men against the universe: “La révolte 
naît du spectacle de la déraison, devant une condition injuste ou 
incompréhensible. Mais son élan aveugle revendique l’ordre au milieu du 
chaos et l’unité au cœur même de ce qui fuit et disparaît.”9 The révolté 
understands that human life has no transcendent meaning, but he chooses to 
side with humans and their ultimately futile desires rather than siding with 
the universe by disregarding those desires and treating human life as 
meaningless. The révolté thus refuses murder. Camus explains that “[l]a 
solidarité des hommes se fonde sur le mouvement de révolte et celui-ci, à 
son tour, ne trouve de justification que dans cette complicité.”10 One who is 
in solidarity with others stands against oppression, although the universe 
offers us no transcendent reason to do so. 
With this background, let us now turn to the beginning of Meursault, 
contre-enquête. Haroun’s complaint is not only that Meursault killed his 
brother but that Meursault told his version of the story with no regard for 
the Arab he killed. This disregard reveals itself in Meursault’s failure to call 
his victim anything but “l’Arabe.” As Haroun explains, “Dès le début, on 
comprenait tout: lui, il avait un nom d’homme, mon frère celui d’un 
accident. Il aurait pu l’appeler ‘Quatorze heures’ comme l’autre a appelé son 
nègre ‘Vendredi.’ […] Quatorze heures, c’est bien. Zoudj en arabe […].”11 
The notion of giving the dead man a name did not even occur to Meursault 
because he was preoccupied with his own sense of the absurd, which 
isolated him rather than leading him to solidarity with others. Haroun 
summarizes Meursault’s exclusive focus on the absurd in his own life:  
C’est le Français qui y joue le mort et disserte sur la façon dont il a 
perdu sa mère, puis comment il a perdu son corps sous le soleil, 
puis comment il a perdu le corps d’une amante, puis comment il est 
parti à l’église pour constater que son Dieu avait déserté le corps de 
2 8 8  |  S o l i d a r i t y  a n d  t h e  A b s u r d  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.733 
l’homme, puis comment il a veillé le cadavre de sa mère et le sien, 
etc.12  
The Arab’s death becomes a mere side detail with little ultimate importance 
to the story of Meursault’s confrontation with a society that seeks in God a 
refuge from the absurd, and it is this neglect of Moussa’s death, more even 
than the murder itself, that angers Haroun. He exclaims, “Bon Dieu, 
comment peut-on tuer quelqu’un et lui ravir jusque sa mort? C’est mon frère 
qui a reçu la balle, pas lui! […] Personne, même après l’Indépendance, n’a 
cherché à connaître le nom de la victime, son adresse, ses ancêtres, ses 
enfants eventuels.”13 He suggests, moreover, that he knows the absurd 
better than Meursault ever did: “L’absurde, c’est mon frère et moi qui le 
portons sur le dos ou dans le ventre de nos terres, pas l’autre.”14 Meursault 
was a French colonizer who lived in a country not his own without realizing 
that he had allied himself with the universe against his Algerian fellow men. 
The French treated Haroun and Moussa as strangers in their own land, and 
now that Algeria is independent, Haroun and Moussa himself remain 
alienated from Moussa’s death, for not even his countrymen have thought to 
ask about the Arab’s life. Moussa was excluded from his own story by a 
stranger concerned only with the absurd and with himself, and that is the 
true absurdity. Haroun suggests that Meursault has no right to be admired 
as a prophet with insight into the absurd, for he rejected solidarity and sided 
with the universe against his fellow men when he murdered Moussa—and 
again when he refused his victim a name. 
The reasons for Haroun’s anger are clear, and an examination of 
L’Étranger confirms the injustice of Meursault’s actions. Meursault’s 
neighbor, Raymond Sintès, asks him to write a letter to his mistress, who 
was cheating on him, to bring her back to him so that he can punish her.15 
Meursault agrees: “je me suis appliqué à contenter Raymond parce que je 
n’avais pas de raison de ne pas le contenter.”16 After Raymond punishes his 
Arab mistress, he asks Meursault to testify that she had cheated on him so 
that he will not be punished for beating her, and Meursault again agrees.17 
Later, at the beach, Raymond recognizes one of the two Arabs present as the 
woman’s brother,18 who had been following him before.19 The brother 
injures Raymond,20 who then returns to the beach with Meursault. 
Meursault shows a willingness to kill: he tells Raymond, “’Mais s’il ne sort 
pas son couteau, tu ne peux pas tirer’”21 and then says, “’Prends-le d’homme 
à homme et donne-moi ton revolver. Si l’autre intervient, ou s’il tire son 
couteau, je le descendrai.’”22 Meursault seems here to have some sense of 
honor, as he insists that Raymond must fight with his hands if the Arab does 
not draw his knife, but he accepts that Raymond wants to start a fight with a 
man who is not attacking, and he feels no repugnance at the possibility of 
killing a man who wants to avenge his sister’s abuse at Raymond’s hands. 
The Arabs leave, but Meursault returns to the beach alone and sees the Arab 
who is the woman’s brother; the Arab draws his knife, and Meursault shoots 
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him.23 Note that the woman is another nameless Arab that Meursault 
wrongs, and if he had not written the letter, the confrontation at the beach 
would never have happened.  
 Let us now return to Daoud’s novel and consider Haroun’s account of 
the woman’s story and of the murder. Haroun asserts, “Précisons d’abord: 
nous étions seulement deux frères, sans sœur à mœurs légères comme ton 
héros l’a suggéré dans son livre.”24 He concludes that the woman was 
Moussa’s mistress and proposes an account of the murder accordingly:  
Peut-être était-elle, après tout, l’une de ses passions. Je me suis 
toujours dit que le malentendu provenait de là: un crime 
philosophique attribué à ce qui, en fait, ne fut jamais rien d’autre 
qu’un réglement de comptes ayant dégénéré. Moussa voulant 
sauver l’honneur de la fille en donnant une correction à ton héros, 
et celui-ci, pour se défendre, l’abbattant froidement sur une plage. 
Les nôtres, dans les quartiers populaires d’Alger, avaient en effet ce 
sens aigu et grotesque de l’honneur.25  
The “peut-être” indicates that he is not sure that the woman was one of his 
brother’s lovers. He attributes to her the name “Zoubida,” but in truth he 
does not know her name or even if she existed: “La femme mystérieuse! Si 
tant est qu’elle ait existé. J’en connais seulement le prénom; je suppose que 
c’est le sien, mon frère l’avait prononcé dans son sommeil, cette nuit-là. 
Zoubida. La nuit d’avant sa mort.”26 Zoubida may have been one of 
Moussa’s mistresses but not Raymond’s, or she may have existed only in 
Moussa’s dream. The facts are obscure, and the story of Zoubida (even if she 
existed and was the woman in question) does not permit a clear moral 
either. One might point out that if the woman existed, then however 
“grotesque” his sense of honor was, Moussa at least stood in solidarity with 
her, unlike Meursault, who saw no reason to not help Raymond punish her. 
Note, however, that in the conflict between Raymond and Zoubida, 
Meursault and Moussa both stood by the person they knew and harmed the 
one they did not know. There is no reason to think that Moussa would have 
cared to avenge a stranger or that Meursault would have refused to help a 
female neighbor who approached him. Whatever the merits of this 
particular case, a sense of honor that always demands vengeance for the 
women one loves can be just as myopic—and hence just as far from 
solidarity with one’s fellows—as a willingness to help one’s neighbors, even 
if what they request is wrong. Haroun offers an act of solidarity that harms 
no one by granting the Arab woman a name—again in contrast to 
Meursault—but although naming her (even if inaccurately) affirms her 
humanity, it is a limited gesture. Our ability to be in solidarity with others is 
often limited, and it is all too easy to mistake undiscerningly helping those 
we know for true solidarity. 
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Haroun’s relationship to his mother also shows how difficult the 
question of solidarity can be. He affirms that he loved her: “L’ai-je aimée? 
Bien sûr. Chez nous, la mère est la moitié du monde. Mais je ne lui ai jamais 
pardonné sa façon de me traiter.”27 The murder of Moussa poisoned their 
relationship, as she wanted him to fill the place of his older brother. As he 
explains, “Je te l’ai déjà dit, le corps de Moussa ne fut jamais retrouvé. Ma 
mère, par conséquent, m’imposa un strict devoir de réincarnation,”28 and he 
naturally resents her attempt to turn him into his brother. Haroun has no 
clear answer to the question of what it means to live in solidarity with 
someone he loves who has wronged him.  
Daoud further complicates the question of solidarity with an allusion 
to Camus’s La Peste: Haroun reflects, “J’aime Oran la nuit, malgré la 
prolifération des rats et tous ces immeubles sales insalubres qu’on repeint 
sans cesse; à cette heure, on dirait que les gens ont droit à quelque chose de 
plus que leur routine.”29 Oran is the city in which La Peste takes place, and 
rats carry the plague that strikes it.30 Haroun’s reflections thus call to mind, 
for readers of Camus, a situation in which the nature of solidarity seems 
clear: when there is a plague, one must fight it. Yet in Haroun’s Oran, there 
is no physical plague to combat and thus no evident way to act on the 
sentiment of solidarity that he feels at night. Not only is it unclear how he 
can live in solidarity with his mother, there is no final answer to the question 
of what exactly it is to live in solidarity with anyone at all—a point the rest 
of Daoud’s novel will reinforce. 
Eventually, Haroun offers a second account of what happened at the 
beach: 
Arabe, je ne me suis jamais senti Arabe, tu sais. C’est comme la 
négritude qui n’existe que par le regard du Blanc. Dans le quartier, 
dans notre monde, on était musulman, on avait un prénom, un 
visage et des habitudes. Point. Eux étaient les ‘étrangers,’ les 
roumis que Dieu avait fait venir pour nous mettre à l’épreuve, mais 
dont les heures étaient de toute façon comptées: il partirait un jour 
ou l’autre, c’était certain. […] Ton écrivain meurtrier s’est trompé, 
mon frère et son compagnon n’avaient pas du tout l’intention de le 
tuer, lui ou son ami barbeau. Ils attendaient seulement. Qu’ils 
partent tous, lui, le maquereau et les milliers d’autres.31 
According to this version of the story, it was not a question of a “règlement 
de comptes,” and Moussa was not on the beach to “donn[er] une correction 
à ton héros.”32 Meursault simply killed a man who was waiting for the 
colonizers to leave and then labeled him with the identity—”Arab”—that 
the colonizers imposed on the colonized. The woman (Zoubida) no longer 
appears in this account, which is simply a story of colonial injustice. But the 
fact that Haroun is offering two versions of the story, one in which Moussa 
wanted to avenge a woman’s honor and one in which he was only waiting, 
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indicates that the facts are not what is most important. As Lia Brozgal 
observes, “Haroun is less interested in representing the ‘facts’ of Moussa’s 
death and more concerned with the meta-story, or the conventions of the 
story’s narration: when it is recounted, by whom, and to what effect.”33 
Haroun criticizes Meursault’s colonialist manner of telling the story, in 
which his failure of solidarity becomes insignificant beside his refusal to do 
what is expected of him in a society that flees from the absurd. Whatever 
really happened at the beach, Meursault wrote about the murder he 
committed yet paid minimal attention to his victim and focused egotistically 
on his own confrontation with society.  
 
Murder and the Need for Solidarity 
But Haroun too has killed, and he finally tells the story in which he 
resembles Meursault. He explains that the murder occurred after he and 
M’ma moved into the house previously owned by M’ma’s French 
employers, the Larquais family, who fled because of Algeria’s war for 
independence.34 Haroun and his mother found a Frenchman who was 
hiding,35 and the presence of M’ma, who desired revenge for the death of 
her son, compelled Haroun to kill him: “Mais M’ma était là, m’interdisant 
toute dérobade et exigeant ce qu’elle ne pouvait obtenir de ses propres 
mains: la vengeance.”36 He shoots the Frenchman at two in the morning, just 
as Meursault killed Moussa at two in the afternoon.37 In a deliberate contrast 
to Meursault’s statement that the four bullets he fired into the Arab’s corpse 
were “comme quatre coups brefs que je frappais sur la porte du malheur,”38 
Haroun states that the two bullets with which he killed the Frenchman were 
“comme deux coups brefs frappés à la porte de la délivrance. C’est du moins 
ce que je crus ressentir.”39 Through this murder, he will realize the 
importance of solidarity, but as he implies, it is not truly a deliverance but is 
an act that isolates him from others. 
Unlike Meursault, Haroun does state the name of his victim: Joseph.40 
He also explicitly considers the significance of murder, observing, “Ton 
héros l’a bien compris, le meurtre est la seule bonne question que doit se 
poser un philosophe. Tout le reste est bavardage.”41 This statement is a clear 
allusion to a line from Camus’s Le Mythe de Sisyphe, but in fact the relevant 
line is about suicide, not murder: “Il n’y a qu’un problème philosophique 
vraiment sérieux: c’est le suicide.”42 Haroun’s statement draws not only on 
that line from Le Mythe de Sisyphe but also on L’Homme révolté, in which 
Camus asserts that “[n]ous ne saurons rien tant que nous ne saurons pas si 
nous avons le droit de tuer cet autre devant nous ou de consentir qu’il soit 
tué.”43 Thus with Meursault, contre-enquête, Daoud emphasizes the other-
centered question posed by the later Camus even as he most clearly 
references the comparatively self-centered phrase of the earlier book. This 
conflation of the questions posed in Le Mythe de Sisyphe and L’Homme révolté 
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is in keeping with the spirit of Camus’s work, as he concludes in L’Homme 
révolté that “[d]ès l’instant où ce bien [la vie] est reconnu comme tel, il est 
celui de tous les hommes. On ne peut donner une cohérence au meurtre si 
on la refuse au suicide.”44 For the later Camus, then, the refusal of suicide is 
equally the refusal of murder, and one who cares for his own life must care 
for that of others. By beginning not with the self and suicide but with the 
other and murder, Haroun emphasizes the question of solidarity (though he 
does so implicitly, as he never uses the word), whereas Le Mythe de Sisyphe 
does not.  
Daoud’s narrator thereby goes beyond Camus’s initial philosophy of 
the absurd, but in a manner consistent with Camus’s L’Homme révolté, in 
which Camus calls us to move beyond merely recogizing the absurd by 
actively revolting against it. As Camus acknowledges, the recognition of the 
absurd does not suffice to reject murder because it leaves murder both 
unacceptable and meaningless:  
Le raisonnement absurde ne peut à la fois préserver la vie de celui 
qui parle et accepter le sacrifice des autres. […] Ainsi, la même 
notion qui nous laissait croire que le meurtre était indifférent lui ôte 
ensuite ses justifications […]. Pratiquement, un tel raisonnement 
nous assure en même temps qu’on peut et qu’on ne peut pas tuer. Il 
nous abandonne dans la contradiction […].45  
It is only the revolt against the absurd that leads to the refusal of murder. As 
Camus explains, “Je crie que je ne crois à rien et que tout est absurde, mais je 
ne puis douter de mon cri et il me faut au moins croire à ma protestation. La 
première et la seule évidence qui me soit ainsi donnée, à l’intérieur de 
l’existence absurde, est la révolte.”46 Once one has chosen to revolt—to live 
as if life had meaning—one sees that one must revolt on behalf of all people: 
I cannot cry out against the absurd solely for my own sake, for there is no 
way to justify refusing the absurd on my own account while siding with the 
universe insofar as it disregards others’ desire to live. If I insist on living as if 
my life had meaning, I must live as though everyone’s life had meaning. 
Camus asserts, “Je me révolte, donc nous sommes,”47 for all of humanity is 
bound together in my revolt. Whatever others choose, if I revolt, it is 
necessarily for them also, not only for myself.  
Ironically, it is not through an initial revolt but through his act of 
murder that Haroun realizes that there are only two coherent possibilities: 
either one sides with the universe and treats all lives, without exception, as 
worthless, thereby betraying the protest against the absurd, or else one 
revolts and treats all lives, without exception, as valuable. Haroun explains, 
Quand j’ai tué, donc, ce n’est pas l’innocence qui, par la suite, m’a 
le plus manqué, mais cette frontière qui existait jusque-là entre la 
vie et le crime. C’est un tracé difficile à rétablir ensuite. L’Autre est 
une mesure que l’on perd quand on tue. Souvent, depuis, j’ai 
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ressenti un vertige incroyable, presque divin, à vouloir – du moins 
dans mes rêveries – tout résoudre, en quelque sorte, par 
l’assassinat. […] Un certain goût pour la paresse s’installe chez le 
meurtrier impuni. Mais quelque chose d’irréparable aussi: le crime 
compromet pour toujours l’amour et la possibilité d’aimer. J’ai tué 
et, depuis, la vie n’est plus sacrée à mes yeux. […] D’ailleurs, mon 
cher ami, le seul verset du Coran qui résonne en moi est bien celui-
ci: ‘Si vous tuez une seule âme, c’est comme si vous aviez tué 
l’humanité entière.’48 
Thus Haroun comes to understand solidarity in reverse, by violating it 
rather than by choosing it. He understands that murder is an assault on all 
of humanity, a realization that accords with Camus’s point that the révolté 
must value the life of all men. By committing a murder and thereby siding 
with the universe that does not grant meaning to any human life, Haroun 
has isolated himself from the human race. As Camus observes, “[s]i ce 
monde n’a pas de sens supérieur, si l’homme n’a que l’homme pour 
répondant, il suffit qu’un homme retranche un seul être de la société des 
vivants pour s’en exclure lui-même.”49 Yet at the same time, others are even 
farther from solidarity than Haroun is, for those who arrest him are, as in 
Meursault’s case, concerned not with the murder but with a comparatively 
trivial detail. Daoud thus skillfully portrays a character who is doubly 
isolated: first because he violated solidarity, and second because he 
understands solidarity and the absurd better than many others. 
The army officer who interrogates him focuses on the fact that Haroun 
killed the Frenchman shortly after the war for independence was over, not 
during the war. Haroun observes, “Je savais que je n’étais pas là pour avoir 
commis un meurtre mais pour ne pas l’avoir fait au bon moment.”50 Had he 
killed the Frenchman before Independence, the killing would have been 
acceptable; only because he did so after Independence is it a problem. As the 
officer tells him, “Le Français, il fallait le tuer avec nous, pendant la guerre, 
pas cette semaine!”51 Unlike Meursault, however, Haroun is released:  
On allait me libérer sans explication, alors que je voulais être 
condamné. Je voulais qu’on me débarrasse de cette ombre pesante 
qui transformait ma vie en ténèbres. Il y avait même quelque chose 
d’injuste à me relâcher ainsi, sans m’expliquer si j’étais un criminel, 
un assassin, un mort, une victime, ou simplement un idiot 
indiscipliné. […] J’avais tué et cela me donnait un vertige 
incroyable. Or personne n’y trouvait fondamentalement à redire. 
Seul l’horaire semblait poser un vague problème. […] La gratuité 
de la mort de Moussa était inadmissible. Or ma vengeance venait 
d’être frappée de la même nullité!52   
Condemnation would be preferable to this release “sans explication,” for 
condemnation would at least confer meaning on his act. Instead, he finds 
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himself confronted with the absurd: the indifference of others forces him to 
acknowledge that the murder he committed has no objective meaning. The 
universe offers no transcendent ground on which to base the decision to 
value life, and it is therefore at odds with the human desire that life be worth 
something. As he confers a significance on his act of murder, Haroun is in 
fact closer to solidarity than are those who release him: he at least realizes 
that he sided with the universe over his fellows, but the others do not 
understand that there is even a conflict. They simply do not care about the 
murder of Joseph Larquais, thus betraying humanity by passively accepting 
the refusal of man’s desire that life have value. In contrast, Haroun does care 
even though he has no transcendent reason to do so.  
One might object that Haroun’s interrogators are acting rationally: a 
revolution requires discipline lest it degenerate into uncontrolled killing, so 
it is reasonable to set limits on when people may kill, but as Haroun did kill 
a colonial oppressor, he is not an ordinary murderer. A full examination of 
how the fight against oppressors can accord with solidarity is beyond the 
scope of this paper; suffice it to note that in truth, Haroun’s killing of Joseph 
does not fit the ready narrative of the oppressed killing the oppressors. As 
Haroun states (before recounting his interrogation), “M’ma savait pourquoi 
elle avait tué et elle était la seule à le savoir! Ni moi, ni Moussa, ni Joseph 
n’étions concernés par sa certitude.”53 By maintaining abstract moral 
certainties that establish Joseph’s death as a meaningful vengeance even 
though they do not help the Algerians, M’ma has taken refuge from the 
absurd that Haroun now confronts. The murder that she pushed him to 
commit did not avenge Moussa or aid in the establishment of justice, and it 
would not have done so even if it had by chance occurred before 
Independence. Moreover, if Haroun’s interrogators believed that there must 
be no killings after Independence in order to protect life as much as possible 
while still overthrowing oppressors, they would at least declare Haroun “un 
idiot indiscipliné.” Rather, they do not care about human life and do not 
want a murdered Frenchman after Independence simply because that does 
not fit their narrative. But as they do not want to punish Haroun, they 
reduce the murder to nothing: it receives no official acknowledgement, and 
Haroun is left alone with the knowledge that he has violated solidarity.  
 
Prophets Without God 
Eventually, Haroun discovers Meursault’s novel thanks to Meriem, a young 
woman who sought out “the Arab’s” family because she is writing her thesis 
on the book.54 He falls in love with her, but she eventually leaves; he 
explains that “elle s’est contentée d’aimer mon chagrin […].”55 Recall also his 
claim that “le crime compromet pour toujours l’amour et la possibilité 
d’aimer.”56 Overshadowed by the murder of Moussa and further isolated by 
his own murder of Joseph, Haroun cannot but lose the woman he loves. He 
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adds, “Depuis, je trahis méthodiquement les femmes et réserve le meilleur 
de moi-même aux séparations.”57 Though the importance of solidarity is a 
theme implicit in his narrative, Haroun, who in addition to having killed 
admits to habitually betraying his lovers, has not found a way to live in 
solidarity with others. 
When he reads Meursault’s book, he is angered by the failure to 
acknowledge his brother—remembering reading the book for the first time, 
he exclaims, “Il y avait tout sauf l’essentiel: le nom de Moussa!”58—yet he 
finds that he resembles this man who also killed. He states, “Cet homme, ton 
écrivain, semblait m’avoir volé mon jumeau, Zoudj, mon portrait, et même 
les détails de ma vie et les souvenirs de mon interrogatoire! C’était une 
plaisanterie parfaite. J’y cherchais des traces de mon frère, j’y retrouvais 
mon reflet, me découvrant presque sosie du meurtrier.”59 In his brother’s 
killer, he recognizes himself, for he too has committed a senseless crime and 
found himself a stranger to the society in which he lives. Commenting on 
the last lines of L’Étranger— “Pour que tout soit consommé, pour que je me 
sente moins seul, il me restait à souhaiter qu’il y ait beaucoup de spectateurs 
le jour de mon exécution et qu’ils m’accueillent avec des cris de haine”60—
Haroun declares,  
Il y avait eu beaucoup de spectateurs, certes, mais pour son crime, 
pas pour son procès. Et quels spectateurs! Inconditionnels, 
idolâtres! Il n’y avait jamais eu des cris de haine parmi cette foule 
d’admirateurs. Ces dernières lignes m’avaient bouleversé. Un chef-
d’œuvre, l’ami. Un miroir tendu à mon âme et à ce que j’allais 
devenir dans ce pays, entre Allah et l’ennui.61  
In Meursault’s final wish, Haroun sees his own fate: he will remain a 
stranger in a country that flees the absurd in religion, and he will be hated if 
he proclaims the reality of the absurd. As he observed earlier in his 
narrative,  
Le vendredi? Ce n’est pas un jour où Dieu s’est reposé, c’est un jour 
où il a décidé de fuir et de ne plus jamais revenir. Je le sais à ce son 
creux qui persiste après la prière des hommes, à leurs visages collés 
contre la vitre de la supplication. Et à leur teint de gens qui 
répondent à la peur de l’absurde par le zèle.62  
For Haroun as for Meursault, mankind is alone in a world with no God who 
could ground meaning, and this realization sets Haroun apart from the 
Muslim majority in Algeria, just as Meursault was isolated from the 
Christian French. Moreover, as his account of his interrogation reveals, 
Haroun is isolated in that he accords significance to murder. Those who 
proclaim objective values grounded in religion ultimately care less for 
human life than Haroun, the murderer who acknowledges the absurd. 
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In treating murder as significant, Haroun is not as far from Meursault 
as it might seem. Of all the characters in L’Étranger, it is in fact Meursault 
who best understands the significance of murder. Consider his reaction to 
his murder of the Arab:  
J’ai compris que j’avais détruit l’équilibre du jour, le silence 
exceptionnel d’une plage où j’avais été heureux. Alors, j’ai tiré 
encore quatre fois sur un corps inerte où les balles s’enfonçaient 
sans qu’il y parût. Et c’était comme quatre coups brefs que je 
frappais sur la porte du malheur.63  
Meursault is in fact the only one who realizes—however inadequately—that 
he has killed a human being. Once he has committed the murder, nothing 
else matters; he has committed an act of destruction, and he might as well 
shoot the corpse, for it does not matter to the murdered man whether his 
killer treats the body in a civilized way. Later, the juge d’instruction asks him, 
“’Pourquoi, pourquoi avez-vous tiré sur un corps à terre?’”64 thus focusing 
not on the murder itself but on the uncivilized action Meursault took 
afterward. When he finally acknowledges the murder, he does not even call 
it a murder: “Il m’a seulement demandé du même air un peu las si je 
regrettais mon acte. J’ai réfléchi et j’ai dit que plutôt que du regret véritable, 
j’éprouvais un certain ennui.”65 To the juge d’instruction, the murder is 
simply an act, not the violent end of a man’s life. Meursault, who does not 
even regret the murder, at least realized that it matters more than the bullets 
he fired at the dead body. Moreover, at the trial, he is finally condemned not 
for the murder but for his apparent indifference to his mother’s death: as the 
prosecutor declares, “’[J]’accuse cet homme d’avoir enterré sa mère avec un 
cœur de criminel.’”66 Meursault’s feeble explanation—”j’ai dit, un peu au 
hasard, d’ailleurs, que je n’avais pas l’intention de tuer l’Arabe”67—fails to 
convince the jury to acquit him not because he acted as if he meant to kill the 
Arab or because it is wrong to kill even unintentionally but because no one 
cares about the dead Arab. Meursault is no révolté who calls for solidarity, 
and his excuse for the murder is poor, but he at least focuses on his real 
crime. As far from solidarity as he is, he is closer to it than are those who 
condemn him for his behavior at his mother’s funeral. 
 Even if Meursault had preached solidarity, we could not turn to him 
for rules telling us how to live, for there are none. Several times throughout 
his narrative, Haroun has mentioned a man he refers to as “’le fantôme de la 
bouteille’” who “vient presque tous les jours ici [au bar]”68 and has “l’air 
intelligent mais en rupture avec les certitudes de son époque,”69 and whom 
he describes as “mon double.”70 Near the end of the novel, when he insists 
on speaking to the “phantom” to satisfy the curiosity of his unnamed 
interlocutor, he notices that the “phantom” “[a] l’air des origines latines 
[…]” and finds that he is “un sourd-muet apparrement tuberculeux […].”71 
The “phantom” is evidently an allusion to Camus himself, as his mother had 
Spanish ancestry and was deaf (and mute, according to some),72 and Camus 
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had tuberculosis.73 Camus and Haroun both reject the false certainties to 
which people flee in an attempt to escape the absurd, but it is Haroun who 
speaks now, and Camus must be silent. The “phantom’s” silence reminds us 
that looking to Camus for final answers would be foolish, for although 
Camus was a great writer and thinker, no one can offer certainty and 
meaning. There is no rule that tells us what actions solidarity requires, and 
we are left to make our own way in the world, working out for ourselves 
what it means to live in solidarity with others.  
It is important to note that Haroun’s story is in no way a justification 
of colonialism. Certainly the French colonizers violated solidarity, as did 
Meursault when he killed Moussa. But as I argued above, Haroun’s murder 
does not fit the narrative of the colonized overthrowing the colonizers. 
Moreover, any narrative that forgets the need for solidarity in the face 
of the absurd fails to address the situation of post-Independence Algeria. It 
is not that Algeria should not have become independent but that now that it 
is, its people must decide what it means to live in solidarity with each other 
in a nation still overshadowed by colonialism and revolution. Camus’s 
appearance as a deaf-mute is also significant in that he must cede the floor to 
a contemporary Algerian who can address the problems of post-
Independence Algeria.74 But far from silencing Camus (who does appear, 
recall, as Haroun’s “double”), Daoud elaborates on and revitalizes Camus’s 
call for solidarity in a new context: that of Algeria after the war. Haroun 
observes, “J’ai vu se consumer l’enthousiasme de l’Indépendance, s’échouer 
les illusions […].”75 French colonialism was unjust, for the colonizers sided 
with a universe devoid of meaning in which human life has no objective 
value, but although Algeria has entered a postcolonial era, the universe 
remains. Daoud’s novel is a call (one that is at the same time universal and 
addressed to his countrymen) to grapple with that reality instead of 
escaping into the abstract certainties of M’ma or of naïve believers who see 
their God chiefly as a ground for objective truth. Crying out to his 
interlocutor against the flight from the absurd that plagues his country, 
Haroun recounts that he once confronted an imam with the same words that 
Meursault used against the priest76 and proclaims,  
C’est une seule phrase que personne ne comprend: ‘Il n’y a 
personne ici! Il n’y a jamais eu personne! La mosquée est vide, le 
minaret est vide. C’est le vide!’ C’est sûr, il y aura beaucoup de 
spectateurs le jour de mon exécution et ils m’accueilleront avec des cris de 
haine. Ton héros avait peut-être raison dès le début: il n’y a jamais 
eu aucun survivant dans cette histoire. Tout le monde est mort 
dans un seul coup, en une seule fois.77 
Meursault and Haroun are two murderers opposing the flight from the 
absurd—and while, as I noted above, Haroun’s criticism of Meursault 
suggests that Meursault has no right to be admired as a prophet with insight 
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into the absurd, unworthy prophets are the best we can hope for, as there is 
no transcendent standard by which we can justify ourselves, and even those 
who are not murderers have been bystanders to oppression. There are no 
survivors, and none are innocent. 
Nearing the end of his story, Haroun says, “Juste une dernière blague 
de mon cru. Tu sais comment on prononce Meursault en arabe? Non? El-
Merssoul. ‘L’envoyé’ ou ‘le messager.’ Pas mal, non?”78 If Meursault was a 
messenger, it does not follow that he was admirable. Recall Haroun’s 
description of Meursault’s admirers as “[i]nconditionnels, idolâtres!”79 It is 
ironic that the people to whom he was a stranger admire him now, and 
blind admiration overlooks the wrongs he committed, but we can still learn 
from his narrative. Camus wrote of Meursault, “Il m’est arrivé de dire aussi, 
et toujours paradoxalement, que j’avais essayé de figurer dans mon 
personnage le seul christ que nous méritions.”80 Meursault is no savior, but 
he is a prophet without God whose story can awaken us to the absurd and 
even to the need for solidarity, provided we do not ourselves violate 
solidarity by admiring him to the point of forgetting that he was a murderer. 
If we remember the murder yet respond to his awareness of the absurd, we 
can perhaps go beyond him by finding a way to live in solidarity with 
others. 
Meursault is not the only prophet of the absurd. “Moussa” is the name 
in Arabic of Moses, an important prophet in Islam,81 and Haroun is the 
name in Arabic of Aaron, Moses’ brother, who according to the Quran was 
also a prophet.82 The Quran states that when God sent Moses to confront 
Pharaoh, Moses requested that Aaron help him: “And my brother Aaron—
He is more eloquent in speech than I: so send him with me as a helper, to 
confirm (and strengthen) me: for I fear that they may accuse me of 
falsehood.”83 Haroun finds himself speaking for Moussa—not as a helper 
and not as one sent by God, but as the only one left to speak for him in a 
world with no God. Moreover, Haroun calls everyone Moussa: “Les gens de 
ce pays ont l’habitude d’appeler tous les inconnus ‘Mohammed,’ moi je 
donne à tous le prénom de ‘Moussa.’”84 If everyone is Moussa, then 
everyone finds himself in the situation of being a prophet without God—and 
if everyone is Moussa, rather than Mohammed, then Haroun is speaking for 
everyone. Although we are all abandoned prophets who, if we speak truly, 
can never prophesy the coming of a savior or receive a word from God, 
perhaps we need not be prophets who work alone. To speak for and with 
others is already a gesture of solidarity, though people who are fleeing the 
absurd might meet it with anger.  
 
Conclusion 
Finally, Haroun asks,  
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Mon histoire te convient-elle? C’est tout ce que je peux t’offrir. C’est 
ma parole, à prendre ou à laisser. Je suis le frère de Moussa ou le 
frère de personne. Juste un mythomane que tu as rencontré pour 
remplir tes cahiers… C’est ton choix, l’ami. […] Deux inconnus 
avec deux histoires sur une plage sans fin. Laquelle est la plus vrai? 
Une question intime. À toi de trancher.85  
Thus he leaves his interlocutor—and the reader—to decide whether his story 
is true. More importantly, he leaves the reader to decide how to respond to 
the absurd and how to attempt to live in solidarity with others. Certainly we 
have no way of determining whether Haroun has told the truth about 
himself, but the force of his story does not lie in the degree to which it 
corresponds to the facts. Rather, his narrative is important because it 
reminds us that we must work out for ourselves what solidarity is. Were he 
a wholly admirable narrator, we might think that his life offers certain 
answers, but as he is not, we are forced to realize that no one at all can offer 
final, certain rules for solidarity, as there is no transcendent reality in which 
such rules could find their ground. Solidarity can only occur in concrete 
situations with concrete people, for it requires that we acknowledge the 
absurd and thus can have nothing to do with the transcendent absolutes to 
which people turn when they flee the absurd.  
Haroun concludes by alluding to Meursault’s conclusion to L’Étranger: 
“Je voudrais, moi aussi, qu’il soit nombreux, mes spectateurs, et que leur 
haine soit sauvage.”86 In a world in which people flee the absurd, simply 
proclaiming the absurd—as Haroun and Meursault have both done—can be 
an act of solidarity, for if people face the absurd, they may go farther than 
the mere acknowledgment of the absurd by seeking solidarity in their turn. 
But there is no guarantee that they will come to acknowledge the absurd, 
and it is more likely that they will respond to such an attempt at solidarity 
with hatred. The genius of Daoud’s novel is that it reminds us of the need to 
live in solidarity with others while at the same time compelling us to realize 
both that it is unclear how to do so when others do not desire solidarity and 
that there is no final answer telling us how to proceed. Those who flee the 
absurd may hate those who seek solidarity, but we must seek to live in 
solidarity with others even if that means facing their hatred. 
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